

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

BORDEAUX AND THE BOURBONS.—The fabricators of political entertainments have lately got up another melo-drama for the amusement of their credulous dupes, whose appetites for lies seem to keep pace with the inventive genius of their interested guides. No sooner had the farce of the "march to Paris" run its hour, than the interlude of "Orange Boven" was brought forward with all the parade calculated to attract the notice of the gaping crowd; and when the versatile character of the multitude rendered it necessary to produce a change of performances, they were again amused by a tragi-comedy, in which a most glorious and splendid victory over the common enemy was introduced, and the benefits to be expected from it, delineated in the most fascinating colours. But even this alluring spectacle has lost its effect, and once more the managers have been driven to their shifts, in order to secure the hold which they have obtained in the minds of a credulous, and, in many cases, a too liberal and generous people. If the Allies have failed in their frequent attempts to reach the French capital, and to put an end to the dynasty of Napoleon; if the Dutch have refused to draw the sword against this scourge of their nation; and if 400,000 veteran troops, who are said to be at this moment in the heart of France, fighting against Bonaparte, have been unable to make any impression upon his raw and undisciplined columns, it appears, notwithstanding the notoriety of these facts, that the mighty task of restoring the Bourbons; of giving the law to 30 millions of people; and of dethroning the sovereign of their choice, is to be effected by 15,000 British soldiers, who, without molestation, have been permitted to enter Bordeaux, a city which, when compared with the whole extent of the French empire, scarcely bears the proportion of one to a hundred. It is an insignificant force of this description, and the entrance of one of the Bourbons into a paltry town like this, which we are

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gravely told is to fix the destinies of a nation like France: it is to this insulated corner we are desired to look for the emancipation of Europe; for the deliverance of the continent from the "iron grasp" of him who has become the "terror and the desolator of the whole earth." Before, however, we give implicit credit to a story so incredible, let us examine the nature of the intelligence which has given rise to this foolish expectation, and see whether or not it warrants the inference drawn from it by those who conduct our public press, and who have been most indefatigable of late in their endeavours to persuade the country, that Ministers had *secretly* pledged themselves to support the Bourbons; that there would be no peace with Bonaparte; and that, of course, we had the very pleasing prospect before us, not only of a counter-revolution in France, and the consequent slaughter of millions of our fellow-creatures, but of another twenty years' war, as if that which is gone by had not already burdened us with an unsupportable load of taxes, and accumulated for our posterity the payment of a debt, which must make them all their lives curse the authors of their calamities, and from which they never can escape but by a national bankruptcy.—The first notice given of the proceedings at Bordeaux was in the *Courier* of the 21st ult. In that servile paper it was said, "that Sir R. Hill entered Bordeaux without the slightest resistance on the part of the Inhabitants, who received the British troops as friends and deliverers, expressing at the same time a hope that no peace would be made with Bonaparte."—Next day we were told, in a Government bulletin, *not* that Sir R. Hill had entered the place, but that this business had been assigned to Marshal Beresford. "The inhabitants (added the *Courier*) came out seven miles to welcome the British hero and his gallant army; acclamations rent the air; they hailed them as their deliverers; hatred of the tyrant was the universal feeling; and they hoisted the Bourbon colours; they displayed the

white cockade; they called out for the Duke of Angouleme." Then came an *Extraordinary Gazette*, and the firing of the Park and Tower guns, to announce to the good people of London the *happy* intelligence. Were I to say all that I think as to the manner in which it was thought proper to frame this *Extraordinary Gazette*, I know I would soon hear of this from a quarter, which would probably make me repent of my temerity. But though I am restrained in my remarks upon it, I am not prevented laying it before the reader, nor can he be hindered forming his own opinion upon the *morceau* that has been given to the public, instead of the *entire* letter which it is admitted was received from Marshal Beresford.

"*Aire, March 14, 1814.*—I inclose Marshal Sir William Beresford's private letter to me, written after his arrival at Bordeaux, from which you will see that the Mayor and people of the town have adopted the white cockade, and declared for the house of Bourbon."

"Marshal Sir W. Beresford's private letter, to which Lord Wellington's dispatch refers, is dated Bordeaux, 12th March, 1814.—It states, in substance, that he entered the city on that day; that he was met a short distance from the town, by the civil authorities and population of the place, and was received in the city with every demonstration of joy.—The magistrates and the city guards took off the eagles and other badges, and spontaneously substituted the white cockade, which had been adopted universally by the people of Bordeaux.—Eighty-four pieces of cannon were found in the city; and an hundred boxes of concealed arms had been produced already."

The *Courier* lately told us, that the dispatches received from our foreign agents were *uniformly* laid before the public in the *exact form and shape* in which they are received. How comes it, then, that a letter of such magnitude as that which announced the rising of the people of France against "the usurper," and their spontaneous declaration in favour of the Bourbons, should not have been published at full length? How is it that we have been deprived of the *felicity* which the perusal of so precious, so interesting, so valuable a document must have afforded to every friend of social order and unlimited monarchy? I leave it to others, more known than I am, to answer these questions; for, in fact, the newspapers have dealt so much of late in garbled quotations and garbled extracts, that I have

found it a very difficult task to distinguish what was false from what was genuine. But, taking the whole of the above statement to be true; admitting that the people of Bordeaux really received the British troops as friends; expressed a hope that no peace would be made with Bonaparte; went seven miles to welcome Marshal Beresford as their deliverer; rent the air with their acclamations; hoisted the Bourbon colours; and displayed the white cockade. Supposing, I say, this to be no exaggeration of the state of the public mind in Bordeaux, what must be our opinion of a people who could, with these sentiments in favour of the former dynasty, submit so long as they have done to the tyranny and oppressions of Bonaparte? nay, not only submit to his exorbitant impositions, but actually furnish him with the means of perpetuating their own slavery. We must either believe them to be the most contemptible and servile wretches on earth, or we must withhold our assent to the representations which have been given of their warm attachment to the Bourbons. We cannot safely question the latter statement, because we have the authority of Government for believing it. We must, therefore, adopt the former; we must believe that the inhabitants of Bordeaux, when they took the oath of allegiance to Bonaparte, swore against their own consciences, and that their whole conduct; all that they have said; all that they have done in support of Napoleon's government, for these ten years past, has been nothing else but reiterated perjury and hypocritical adulation. If this be the case, and who can doubt it after reading the *Courier*, what reliance are we to have upon the declarations of such a people? Where is the rule, where the criterion, by which we can determine that the whole inhabitants of a place, who have been uttering nothing but lies for so long a period, are *now* telling us the truth? are now sincere in their professions?—Were it not that I might be called to account for questioning the authority of an official statement, I might be disposed to think that some mistake had inadvertently crept into our *Gazette*. I might, perhaps, contend, that it was more consistent with human nature to suppose, that the people of Bordeaux were on this occasion acting a part more consistent with their own safety, and their own interest, than with their loyalty to the house of Bourbon. They could not be ignorant, if an invading army entered their city as conquerors, that they would be subjected to severe imposi-

tions; but if *invited* to come, that both their persons and property might be respected. Accordingly, when it was first reported that a deputation had been sent from Bordeaux to welcome the approach of our army, it was distinctly stated, that this was "under a stipulation that no injury should be done to the inhabitants." By thus seeming to acquiesce in the occupation of the place, they were actuated by a very natural and judicious policy. Had they done otherwise, and offered resistance, they could not calculate on any thing but destruction, as they had not troops sufficient to oppose the invaders. But there is another view to be taken of the matter, which appears to me of some importance. Are we altogether certain that the invitation given to Lord Wellington by the inhabitants of Bordeaux, was not the result of a previous project of Marshal Soult to ensnare his Lordship; to place him in a situation where he could not defend himself, as at Torres Vedras, against a superior army; and thus compel him to seek for safety in his shipping? This, at least, has the appearance of probability; otherwise it is not easy to account for Soult leaving the road entirely open for our troops, when he must have known (if it be true) that the inhabitants of Bordeaux were unanimous in their hostility to his master, and decidedly attached to the Bourbons. Besides, we find that Napoleon entertains no fears as to our army in that quarter, nor of any attempts which can be made to give importance to the cause of his rival. He withdrew part of Soult's army to support his operations in a distant part of the empire, though he knew full well that the consequence would be the immediate advance of the British army, and that there was a member of the house of Bourbon with Lord Wellington. Considering the active police established in France, and particularly the late energetic measures taken to counteract all attempts at counter-revolution, it is scarcely credible that Napoleon could be ignorant of the state of the public mind at Bordeaux; and if it is such as has been represented, it is not easy to persuade one's self that he would have neglected all those precautions which prudence dictated to be necessary, for the purpose of counteracting the mischief which he knew would undoubtedly follow. I may be wrong in supposing that an understanding subsists between Soult and the people of Bordeaux; but when I consider the above circumstances, and also recollect that the inhabitants of that place, as well as of every other

city in France, so very lately evinced their devotion and attachment to Bonaparte by enabling him to recover his fallen fortunes, I am inclined to believe, that the cry which has been raised about the hoisting of the Bourbon standard in the South of France, will turn out like the clamour of Orange Boven, which, whether the Dutch have derived any benefit from it or not, has had no other effect here but to raise the price of many articles of the first necessity far above their real value. But it has been attempted by the conductors of the vile press of this country, not only to persuade the public, that the people of Bordeaux have proved themselves to be the infamous persons above described, but that "the whole of the South of France is in a state of insurrection against Bonaparte." They have even gone so far as to assert, that the British government have given their aid, their countenance, and their support, to the royalists who are now in France, and in the train of the Bourbons. Had a statement so unqualified as this appeared in any other journal than the *Courier*, it would have merited silent contempt. But appearing, as it has done, in a journal claiming the character of being the organ of government, and put forth with all the solemnity of an *official* statement, it ought not to be allowed to pass unnoticed. A pretended news-paper, said to have been printed and published at Bordeaux "by order," without mentioning by whom, or under what authority this order was given, has been referred to as evidence of the fact. But it will easily be seen from the nature of the language used by the *Courier*, that the writer of this journal intended it to be believed, that our government actually participated in the measures adopted by the partisans of the Bourbons, to restore Louis XVIII. to the throne of France. The following is the article to which I allude:—"These documents (says the *Courier*), supposing, which we see no reason to doubt, that the Bordeaux paper has given a faithful report of Lord Wellington's and Marshal Beresford's assurances, prove that the British Government have DETERMINED to afford their powerful support to the legitimate cause, to the rights of Louis XVIII. as King of France. We entered Bordeaux as a city acknowledging Louis XVIII.; we entered it as a city belonging to an ally. Our General caused this to be distinctly understood. He sanctioned the conviction in the minds of the people that we treated the Bourbon cause as our own. The sacred

flame spreads, under the belief that it is *nourished and cherished by this great nation*. Having broken the power of usurpation in Portugal and Spain, *we have entered France, and taking a Prince of the legitimate family in our hands*, he has proclaimed his object to be, *supported by us*, the overthrow of the usurpation of Bonaparte and the restoration of Louis XVIII. *Lord Wellington and Marshal Beresford have COMMITTED THEIR GOVERNMENT, and it is impossible to suppose that they would have committed it without being authorised*. The knowledge of this will spread with rapidity from the South to every other part of France, and sure we are that it will be a town of strength to the good cause. The principle is now fairly afoot: it has room to act, and we shall be surprised indeed if its progress be not as rapid as the most sanguine friends to the cause could wish. Guyenne is the most populous province, we believe, in France. Guyenne, Gascony, and Bearn, have declared themselves. Poitou and Saintonge are said to have manifested the same disposition, and we cannot permit ourselves to doubt that Brittany will be eager to throw off the accursed yoke. *The proper steps have been taken to make the events that have taken place on the banks of the Garonne, known throughout France*. Above all, the tranquillizing assurance, that no change is intended in the state of property, an assurance which removes one of the main props of the Usurper's authority, is likely to have the most beneficial effect. Under all these circumstances, so full of hope and promise to the good cause, a cause in which are involved the real repose and happiness of the world, we cannot suppose that any of the Allies will longer entertain the idea of making peace with Bonaparte. Indeed he is not now Master of France; he cannot give security for the fulfilment of the terms of the treaty. He might be deprived of the sovereign authority the very week after this treaty had been signed with him."—After perusing the above statement, will any one for a moment doubt that our government had long ago made the cause of the Bourbons the cause of Britain,—and had determined to prosecute the war until they had overturned the throne of Napoleon? "The British government have determined to afford their powerful support to the legitimate cause, to the rights of Louis XVIII. as King of France."—"Lord Wellington and Marshal Beresford have committed their government, and it is impossible to

suppose that they would have committed it without being authorized."—Certainly not. If they were authorized to pledge the assistance of our government, they did right to commit it. They could not with propriety have done otherwise. But then how are we to reconcile this pledge, with the repeated professions of ministers for these last ten years, that they had no intention of intermeddling with the internal government of France? How account for their recognition of the title of Bonaparte, by sending Lord Castlereagh to enter into negotiations with his minister, by acknowledging his title of "Emperor of the French" in our public parliamentary debates, and in a variety of other instances?—How, I say, can we reconcile this marked and unequivocal sanction which our government has given to Napoleon's claim to the crown of France, with what the *Courier* now tells us has all along been the secret and hidden intentions of ministers? Either the *Courier* deceives the public (and this is nothing uncommon) as to the views of government, or this country is acting a part the most disgraceful imaginable, and which must render it an object of contempt among all other nations. If the former is the case, then ought the author of these lies to suffer the punishment which his conduct merits. If there is such a thing as a *libel* upon a government, surely the individual who attributes to its actions that which is manifestly infamous, ought rather to be made to feel the weight of an *ex-officio* information, than he who, perhaps inadvertently, has told too much of the truth.—In a subsequent *Courier*, something appeared like a *retraction* of what it had previously advanced respecting the alleged countenance given by our government to the Bourbons.—The *Times* newspaper also, which carries its viperation even farther against the French Emperor than its brother in iniquity, would fain recal all that it advanced upon the subject. It even gives the lie direct to the *Courier*, when speaking of the assurance said to have been given by Lord Wellington and Marshal Beresford to the partisans of the Bourbons. "No such occurrence (say the *Times*) took place in the present instance; and, indeed, if it had, the government would still have been at perfect liberty to disavow the unauthorized acts of its officers." But the *Courier*, feeling indignant at this treatment, and evidently repenting its former concessions, now thinks proper to reiterate the *original* statement in the following terms:—"It



is asked, do Ministers 'think it necessary to justify themselves from the charge of countenancing the Bourbons in the South?' *To be sure they do not*: war justifies us in doing what we can to annoy our enemy. Our orders to our Naval Commanders are to sink, burn and destroy. By land we must distress the enemy as much as we can; and even if we had no attachment to the Bourbons as the lawful family, still we should be justified in *countenancing* them, or any other party that was against Bonaparte."——I am willing, for once, to give the *Courier* writer credit for what he says about giving his support to *any party* that declares against Bonaparte; for I verily believe, if he thought he could form a league with the Devil to overthrow Napoleon, he would put his name to the contract to-morrow. But I am not disposed to assent so readily to what he says respecting the countenance given by ministers to the Bourbons. It is true, our commanders have a right to annoy the enemy's forces by land and by sea; but this is a very different matter from giving our support to a party, who meditate the subversion of the government, established by the people with whom we are at war. In a recent proclamation of Marshal Soult, he accused my Lord Wellington, though I would fain hope unjustly, of exciting the French to *civil war*,—to *revolt* and to *sedition*.——According to the *Courier* doctrine, this would be *justifiable*. Yet how often has this writer affected to repel the charge, with indignation, when brought against the Allies by Bonaparte, whom alone he accuses of meditating the overthrow of other States, and in whom only he considers this to be a crime. It is unnecessary to multiply words to show, what has been so often demonstrated, that no country whatever has a right to dictate the law to another, even in any circumstances; much less when the people whom it is attempted to controul, hold an elevated rank in the scale of nations. In the present instance, and supposing all that the *Courier* has told us about the Bourbons to be true, it is clear that this country has interfered without the concurrence of our Allies. I do not see that Alexander has declared himself explicitly on the subject, but there now remains no doubt as to the sentiments of Austria, and even the Crown Prince of Sweden, if his interference is to be considered of any importance, has actually *prohibited*, by a formal edict, the wearing of the white cockade in those parts of the Netherlands belonging to the French

Empire, through which he has passed. How then we, in this country, can think ourselves capable of bringing about a counter-revolution; how, single handed, we can calculate upon restoring the throne of the Bourbons, appears to me to be one of the silliest notions that ever entered the heads of any people. Even with the forces of nearly all Europe in our pay, and the command of means almost unlimited in their extent, we have not been able, after a war of more than twenty years, to make any sensible impression upon France. She has no doubt been frequently brought to a very low state, much lower than she is at present; but the greatness of her difficulties, her repeated disasters and defeats, have only served as a stimulus to her energies, and, in the end, to place her on a more elevated station than the one she previously occupied. If, therefore, she has already baffled all the attempts of the former coalitions; if, when her government was in the hands of feeble administrators, and her armies frequently betrayed by the treachery of her generals, she triumphed over all her foes; if when the South of France was almost entirely overrun by the adherents of the Bourbons, and the recollection of that unfortunate family yet alive in the minds of thousands, she was able to avert the storm that threatened her ruin; how much more must she be capable of extricating herself now when her affairs are in the hands of a chief who knows how to govern and how to conquer; who, in all circumstances, appears to possess the full confidence of his subjects; who has established a code of laws in France, calculated, in a very superior degree, to promote their happiness; and who has given to persons and to property a greater security than was enjoyed at any former period in that country. It is idle, it is ridiculous to say, that what has passed at Bordeaux affords evidence, that the whole people of France, or even a small portion of them, are prepared for a counter-revolution; because it is quite obvious, even supposing a fair representation to have been given of the business, that the defeat of Soult, which rendered the approach of Lord Wellington's immense army to Bordeaux almost certain, was sufficient of itself to produce an effect favourable to the Bourbons, whose cause care had been *previously* taken to make the inhabitants believe his Lordship had espoused, and whose misfortunes he was about to avenge. Restore Bordeaux to its former situation, by removing our army to

a distance, and thus banishing from the minds of the people all fear of punishment in their persons or property, and it will then be seen how they will act. It may then be said, with some appearance of truth, but not till then, that the sentiments which they avow, are the genuine and spontaneous effusions of a free people.

FRENCH SUFFERERS AND THE QUAKERS.

"He that hasteth to be rich hath an evil eye."
Prov. c. xxviii, v. 22.

Sir,—You have made some very judicious and sensible remarks on the Quakers making so prominent a part in the list of subscribers to relieve the Germans; and you seem to think their principles would lead them to do the same for our enemies, the French; for that the latter are in the same situation as the former, you have proved by documents from the *Moniteur*, entitled surely to as much respect as the letters published by Ackermann, the print-seller and caricaturist. I am afraid, however, that upon due inquiry and observation, you will find the Quaker society as degenerated as the rest of us, and that they are guided by a few men, whose wealth having brought them into connexion with Government, they are eager on all occasions to evince their *loyalty*, or, in other words, their attachment to the Powers that be. *Commerce* has been the evil on which this society has split; commerce, which, as Thomas Paine observed, "they follow with a step as steady as time, and an appetite as keen as death." The influence of this baneful pursuit I remember to have been first visible during the American war; but its rapid strides during the present war are almost incredible.—We have now Quaker bankers, Quaker merchants, and Quaker *contractors*; yes, Mr. Cobbett, even contractors; men, whose dress shew them to be the pillars of "our Israel," will go from their silent meetings, and *contract* to supply Lord Wellington's army with flour, &c. Now, if the Society allows itself, on all *public* matters to be guided by this description of persons, they must necessarily be widely different from what they are represented to have been in the time of Barclay and Penn.—Compare the manly and nervous address on peace of the former of these eminent men to the profligate Charles 2d, and the late nondescript address of the Quaker body to

the Prince Regent, and you will form a pretty just idea of the degeneracy of this body of Christians.—With regard to the subscription, however, it should be remarked, that the *country* Quakers are more modest than their London brethren; for they send up their remittances under one head; while the names of the latter are displayed in the daily papers, with all Pharisaical pomp; but this, I suppose, must rest with their *Secretary*, Mr. HOWARD, who seems to know the modern mode of working on the benevolent! Nay, this man has taken upon him to print the names of the Quaker subscribers in London, and to send them all over England, to excite others to imitate their example; and, perhaps, to *shame* those sensible and reflecting men, who think they can take as much care of their money, and do as much good with it as other people. The dissenters are continually brawling against the degenerate clergy; but with what face can they do it, when such a proceeding as the above is tolerated in that sect, where so much manly independence used to be found! I am afraid I shall trespass too much upon your indulgence; but I wish to ask, how it happens, that in this German subscription, the *Royal* family and nobility are quite omitted? I do not perceive one name distinguished either in the political or literary world. Our ministers, also, do not come forward. Have no applications been made in these quarters? If so, I suppose they think proper to leave all the charity to the *honest* and well meaning, for such I believe are most of the subscribers, and they only want discrimination to make them good and useful citizens.—I am your sincere well-wisher,

GEORGE TRUEMAN.

Pimlico, March 14.

P.S.—As Mr. Secretary Howard is a Quaker, perhaps the public will be furnished with all the items of expense attending advertisements, &c. &c. &c. occasioned by the German subscription.

VANITY AND HUMANITY.

MR. COBBETT,—It will not, I believe, be disputed, that if a man gains wealth by his own ability and industry, he certainly possesses power to dispose of that wealth in any way or manner he may think proper; but if a *good name* be his object, he would take a singular method to obtain it by bestowing his bounty upon *aliens* and *foreigners*, to whom he is a perfect stranger, when, and without any cause, he neglects

his needy relatives, whom he knows to be in a state of pauperism.—In my letter to you of the 2d instant, I took notice of a Charity Sermon that was to be preached on the Sunday following at the parish church of St. Ann, Blackfriars', for the benefit of the German Sufferers. I also observed, that the worthy Rector had devoted the same pulpit, some weeks before, to the same laudable purpose, for the sole benefit of the poor of his flock. I should have mentioned also, that the Afternoon Lecturer, in both cases, took up the subject, and made some small collection. There were, therefore, two separate Sundays devoted to preaching at the *same* church, by the *same* eminent Divine, to the *same* congregation, and upon the *same* occasion,—namely, to relieve *misery* and *distress*, and that brought on by the *same* cause,—the *calamities* of war.—The suffering German is expelled from his cottage and property by a merciless enemy; the suffering Englishman by the hand of a friend, a civil officer, who, at the command of a collector, takes forceable possession of his house, to seize for the King's taxes, and the landlord sweeps the cottage for the arrears of rent. They are both deprived of the comforts of a habitation, and find themselves and families reduced to misery and want.—Point out to me, Sir, if you can, the difference in the situation of these two parties. In the estimation of some people, there must be a difference, and a great difference too (though I cannot see it), as it is a notorious fact, that the suffering Germans have four times the pity and assistance of the suffering English.—What is it that these *newly* acquired friends, the suffering Germans, have done for us, which they have not already been paid for, that entitles them so strongly to our compassionate regard? It is not yet twelve months since they stood in battle array against us, and it is not impossible that in less than six months they may again assume the same hostile position, whoever will give themselves the trouble to examine into the conduct of the Germans towards this country for the last hundred years, will easily discover that *gratitude* is not their most prominent virtue. I hear many people prate about their love of country, and I have been simple enough to imagine they meant the *people* of the same country in which they were born and brought up; but I have discovered my mistake. It is the *soil* they mean, on which they tread, and *not* the people. The people may go to the—I'll say no worse—

to the workhouse, and that is bad enough.—No, no, it is the Germans, the *beloved* Germans, who have won our hearts, and claim our solicitude, our cares, and our attentions; to such a degree, indeed, that I should not be surprised if England should be nearly deserted, as it is very natural for men to be fond of the company of those who so completely possess their esteem and affection.—But, to return to the collection made for the poor of the parish of St. Ann's. The two sermons preached on that occasion produced a collection considerably under £30; but when the sermons were preached for the benefit of the German sufferers, the hearts of the hearers were certainly softened; they were thawed either by *political* heat, or the warm sun-beams of *vanity*: it is *impossible* it could be from *humanity*. The sermon in the morning produced £93, and, if I am rightly informed, that in the afternoon raised £17.—Judge, Sir, from these facts, what little feeling there is in the hearts of Englishmen for the suffering English, and that, too, in the severest weather I ever remember, and I am not a chicken.

A FRIEND TO HUMANITY.

Blackfriars, March, 1814.

STOCK EXCHANGE MORALITY.

MR. COBBETT,—It may be customary to introduce an anonymous letter with an exordium of high-flown compliments to the Editor. This, however, I must beg leave to wave at present.—Without any personal acquaintance with yourself, your Register has for many years afforded me both pleasure and information; and, except when you have condescended to drag *obscure* individuals into a kind of fame, by laying open to the public their silly speeches or dishonest actions, I have uniformly admired your talent and your selection of subject, deeming your labours highly beneficial to humanity.—A late event, I am glad to find, has not escaped your eagle-eye, nor your still sharper pen: I do not mean any of the *former*, but the last imposition practised upon that *highly esteemed* and truly *respectable* body of men, the Stock-jobbers;—men who *never* wish to profit by false rumours!—men who, for self-defence, ought to be particularly upon their guard against the manœuvres of Jacobins, who make no scruple of asserting that the war and the national debt yield support to the Stock-jobber, and therefore wish to put an end to both.—Morality, forsooth, in the

mouths of Stock-jobbers!—It is certainly very disgusting to hear men talk of a thing they themselves neither practise nor understand.—The squeamish consciences of these gentlemen are much revolted at the late hoax practised upon them. They are out of pocket by it: they are losers; therefore they have lugged in morality.—Pray what is the foundation of the national debt? What is the cause of its increase? What is the nature of Stock-jobbing in the Alley? Which bears the highest premium, Morality or Omnium? Is it customary for the buyers to proclaim a victory before they buy? or for the venders to boast of bad news before they sell? Do they not all endeavour to buy cheap and sell dear? Do they not all seize upon the slightest advantage either way? Do they not most eagerly make a profit of credulity? Was this fraud the *first*, the *only one* that has ever taken place? Why do they appeal to Government for present redress and future prevention? Do they not see in our public papers fraud practised, openly avowed and authorized? Of what description was the act of that Commander who obtained the secret, and *counterfeited* the cypher of the enemy? Oh! but that was a *ruse de guerre*! say these gentlemen, and therefore allowable.—Very well; since you will have it so, let the hoax be also deemed a *ruse de guerre*. Gambling is a species of warfare; the combatants in the one case thirsting for blood, in the other thirsting for money! A Cossack and a Stock-jobber are more allied than is generally imagined; although, upon reflection, we may easily discover a relation's joy, a family affection, in the excessive caresses shewn to a cousin Cossack who visited the metropolis some months ago.—Excuse my hasty scribble, but I belong to a Bible Society, and some of our members as well as myself make a practise of going our rounds regularly, to discover what green-grocer or what chandlers' shops expose their ware to sale on a sabbath-night.

Sabbath evening. SIMON PANTEGRUEL.

NATIONAL REFORM.

MR. CORBETT,—As your Register has been, and is now, the great means of diffusing important political truth to our *thinking* nation, you will oblige one of your constant readers, as well as the friends of general liberty, by inserting the following plan of national reform, to support our minds under the present expensive contest

with France. The plan which I propose is more certain and stable than the Sinking Fund, and is such as no honest man can, I conceive, oppose with any show of justice. It ought to unite all parties, because it is founded on general equity, and gives equal religious rights and privileges to all sects and denominations; and, as a great excellency, will do no injury to any individual.

1st. Let every person, of whatever order, office, or description, who belongs to and receives any emolument from the established national religion, enjoy his income during his life.

2d. Let the government sell all the tithes, at the death of the incumbents, and apply the church revenues to the purpose of paying off the interest of the national debt, &c.

This is the whole of my simple plan; and, besides its political usefulness, it will serve to restore religion to its primitive simplicity, as its Founder left it. It is well known, that Christianity, before it had any union with worldly establishments, or had received any support from national emoluments, even though opposed and persecuted, made its irresistible way through the Roman empire, but when it became a national institution, it lost its essence as a spiritual religion, was changed into a corrupt, mercenary, and persecuting religion, a kingdom of this world, and an engine of the state. No person of the church of England can reasonably complain of the above plan, because they may enjoy their religion on the *same terms* as all other sects; and being the minority, they ought to consider the good of the whole, but, as being *professing Christians*, they ought to remember that *equal justice* is due to all, without favour or distinction.

A FRIEND TO JUSTICE.

UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD.

ON THE VICE-CHANCELLOR'S COURT, AND POWER OF THE PROCTORS.

MR. EDITOR,—In the discussion that has taken place in Oxford, in consequence of the observations on certain statutes of that University, and on the power of the Proctors, which appeared in your Register of the 26th ult. I have heard the writer taxed with a culpable omission in not stating that the sentence of the Vice-Chancellor's Court is not final; but that any person, who conceives himself aggrieved by any proceedings in that Court, has means of redress by an *appeal*.—I beg leave to say, that the

appeal is generally considered as nugatory, and so completely out of the power of a poor client, as not to be worth mentioning, and as only calculated to add insult to injury.

—Respecting the appeal, BLACKSTONE informs us, that from the sentence of the Vice-Chancellor, his deputy or assessor, “an appeal lies to delegates appointed by the Congregation, from thence to other delegates of the House of Convocation; and if all three concur in the same sentence, it is final, at least by the statutes of the University, according to the rule of the civil law. But, if there be any discordance or variation in any of the three sentences, an appeal lies, in the last resort, to judges delegates appointed by the Crown under the great seal of Chancery.”*—Now, Sir, not to insist upon the impossibility of a poor client having recourse to so tedious and so expensive a mode of seeking redress from the sentence of this Court, I shall only observe, that the names of the Vice-Chancellor, of both the Proctors, and not unfrequently of some of the Pro-Proctors,† are among the delegates of appeals both in Convocation and Congregation! I hope, then, we shall no more hear of the easy method of a poor person’s obtaining redress, and of the utter impossibility of his being persecuted by the University-officers.

—I hope, as the matter is now *beginning to be agitated*, that the members of the University will express their abhorrence of some late disgraceful proceedings, which are well known, and which have long been the chief topic of conversation in Oxford.

—From my long residence in the University, I have been personally acquainted with several of the Proctors, who have been men of judgment and of acknowledged benevolence, and who have discharged the duties of their office with honour and integrity. It is to be lamented, that some others have displayed a total want of proper feeling, and have behaved like tyrannical school-boys.—To produce instances of cruelty and tyranny is always an unpleasant task, and is disgusting to the reader. The cause of truth and humanity, however, requires that facts be brought forward in support of assertions.—I can bring an instance of a Pro-Proctor, who carried his assumed power to such a length as to stop every woman he met walking by herself, in the streets, in the dusk of the evening, and to demand of her who she was, whence

she came, whither she was going. This, to say the least of it, was highly inquisitorial. It must have been done to gratify an impertinent curiosity, an insatiable lust of power, or something worse. To the inhabitants of the place, who are daily subject to the effects of such abuse of power, this conduct cannot but be irritating, and must conduce to keep up that jealousy and ill-will, which have always existed between the University and city. It may, perhaps, be said, that this exertion of assumed authority did not arise from any badness of heart, but merely from the excusable desire which a young man feels to display his consequence on his first entrance into office.

—It is difficult, indeed, to restrain the expression of our pity at the weakness of that man, who can be proud of an office, which is merely ministerial, and which places him, in the eye of the law, in nearly the same situation as that of a common constable.—It must, however, be remarked, that this was not only a very foolish, but a very illegal proceeding, being totally unwarranted either by the law of the land, or by the University-charters.—By the latter, the time of watch and ward is limited between nine o’clock at night and five in the morning, during which time only the University-officers have the right or power of interference in the streets with any but matriculated persons. This, however, I know to have been done with impunity. An action could not be brought against the aggressor in any other court than that of the Vice-Chancellor.—I knew a Proctor, who, at the very time when several females, whom he himself had apprehended, were confined in prison, at a most inclement season of the year, had so little sense of propriety and feeling, and so much meanness and brutality, as to exult on the success of the *cunning* plans and stratagems by which he had entrapped his victims.—To add to this unpleasant, but necessary recital, I remember a circumstance to have happened, of so unjustifiable a nature, that the very recollection of it rouses my indignation. The Proctors took the trouble of going two miles out of Oxford, late at night, and entered a cottage, where five or six girls of bad character were dancing with countrymen who lived in their neighbourhood. On finding that no gownsmen were there, it is said, that they all demurred except one of the Pro-Proctors, who declared that his walk should not be in vain. The fact, however, was, that they took the girls to Oxford, and the Vice-Chancellor commit-

* Blackstone’s Commentaries, B. iii. ch. 6.

† Each Proctor has two Masters of Arts to assist him, who are called Pro-Proctors.

ted them to the county gaol for ten days, in very cold weather.* On what legal authority, or what law of the land, or statute of the University the commitment was founded, still remains a problem, which might be solved, could the cause be brought into any other than the Vice-Chancellor's own court.—The above facts can be well attested. Do not, however, imagine, that this severity has at all improved the morality of the place. The case is quite the reverse. The money of the young men is now expended, and their time wasted in hiring carriages and horses to pursue their pleasures in the neighbouring towns and villages, and in Oxford itself seduction is very prevalent.—It must be allowed, indeed, that the Proctors are not the only persons to be blamed for these injudicious proceedings. To the Vice-Chancellor for the time being must be attributed the greater share of the blame; for it must be remembered, that no commitment can take place but by his warrant, or by that of one of the Pro-Vice-Chancellors acting for him.—If the officers of the University had common sense or common prudence, they would act with some degree of moderation; they would not insist upon the enforcement of statutes, and the exertion of privileges, which were always odious and unconstitutional, and which ill accord with the temper and spirit of the times. If, however, they are determined still to persist in these measures, contrary to the voice of justice and reason, they cannot have any cause to complain if they shall be deprived of their means of annoyance; for this business now calls for the interference of Parliament; and a petition from the inhabitants of Oxford, stating their grievances, might place them within the protection of the law of the land, and put them on a footing of equal security with the inhabitants of other places.

Oxford, March, 1814.

CAPT. CAMPBELL AND MR. MANT.—The Proprietor of the Register has received from Capt. Campbell the following short statement, which, after the very ample space that has been given to the subject, he has determined shall be the *last*, unless

* There was no riot or disturbance in the house. When the men who were with the girls said that they were ready to protect them from the Proctors, the girls would not suffer any interference of that sort, but said that they would go quietly with the Proctors to Oxford, which they did.

some circumstance of importance, which he cannot possibly foresee, should induce him to depart from his determination.—

Capt. Campbell, observing from Mr. Mant's statement, in the Political Register of the 12th of March, that Mr. Mant "has the full authority from numerous friends, and of the greatest respectability, to proclaim, that *his veracity stands unimpeached*," and this after his *only* ground of defence had been proved to be *false* by the oath of Captain Wilson; Captain Campbell observing this, would gladly have avoided any thing calculated to diminish the content which must necessarily have arisen from the consolatory decision of *so numerous and respectable a circle*. But, Mr. Mant, not satisfied with having thus happily established his *veracity*, takes occasion again to state certain pretended facts of accusation against Captain Campbell, which, though they present nothing new, are now circulated in a manner that entitles them to some attention on the part of Capt. Campbell.—The *FIRST* is, an insinuation respecting 1,500 Venetian Zeechens. It is evident, that Mr. Mant, in the passage alluded to, wishes to cause the public to believe, that Capt. Campbell took this sum as a *sort of bribe*.—The truth of the matter is this. The sum was lodged, by the merchants of Trieste, in the hands of the English Vice-Consul at that place, for the purpose of purchasing a sword, or a piece of plate, for Capt. Campbell, in return for the protection he had, at the desire of Sir Alexander Ball, given to certain Austrian vessels, cleared out for Tunis, but the real destination of which was Malta. The Vice-Consul (not a very likely channel for bribe) made Capt. Campbell acquainted with it. But he, considering that the offer did not come from his own countrymen, and that it was not becoming him to accept of it, refused the offer; and the money was returned to the Merchants.—Capt. Campbell has in his possession the receipt of the Merchants, given to the Vice-Consul for the return of the money to them; the certificate of the Vice-Consul that he had returned the money; and, what would certainly excite the indignation of all mankind, except that "numerous and respectable body of friends, who have fully authorized Mr. Mant to publish that *his veracity stands unimpeached*," Captain Campbell has in his possession a paper

“ (demanded from Mr. Mant in consequence of his former insinuations), signed by Mr. Mant, and drawn up in his own hand, “ declaring *most solemnly*, that “ this identical sum of money, offered as “ above-stated, *was actually returned by* “ *Capt. Campbell’s direction.*” — The “ *Second* allegation, or rather insinuation, “ is, that Capt. Campbell has left 40,000 “ dollars *unaccounted for*; from which “ the public are left to believe, that he may “ have really embezzled that sum. — The “ sum was *twenty*, instead of *forty* thousand dollars, a mistake, which Mr. “ Mant’s “ numerous and greatly respectable “ friends” will, of course, look upon “ as not the smallest ground of impeachment of his *veracity*. This sum belonged “ to the squadron, on account of prize-vessels. It was sent by Capt. Campbell, “ by the Captain of a brig of war, to “ Malta. He, on calling at Corfu, on his “ way to Malta, received dispatches of importance from our Minister there to convey to Lord Collingwood, then at the “ mouth of the Dardanelles. He, therefore, deposited the money with Mr. Forresti, our Minister, to be forwarded to “ Malta by the first conveyance. But, almost immediately after, Corfu was given “ up by the Russians to the French, and “ Mr. Forresti was obliged to quit the “ place in such haste, that it was left behind, where, as he has informed Capt. “ Campbell, it now remains. It is only “ necessary to add, that Capt. Campbell, “ on behalf of himself and the squadron, “ holds the bond of Mr. Forresti for this “ money; and, that of all the history and “ all the circumstances of this transaction, “ Mr. Mant is, and from the first to the “ last has been, perfectly well acquainted. “ — But, it would, doubtless, be no difficult matter for Mr. Mant to obtain the “ same *respectable authority* to publish as “ long as he pleased, that he was, in putting “ forth this insinuation, actuated by the “ purest motives, and by any thing rather “ than *malignity*. — The *THIRD* insinuation is, that Capt. Campbell *gave away* “ four vessels, prizes to the squadron under “ his command. Mr. Mant calls it an *ap-parent* giving away, and, having such a “ stock of current veracity at command, “ says quite enough to produce a belief “ (that is to say, amongst his *numerous* “ and *respectable friends*), that Captain “ Campbell made over the vessels to some “ one, *to be disposed of for his own private* “ advantage; or, in other words, that he

“ committed an act of most flagrant roguery. — It is not very probable that the “ squadron should have quietly submitted “ to so singular a distribution of prize-money. But, the facts of the case are “ these. — The English Consul at Trieste “ had given papers to four Austrian vessels, “ coming out of that port, which papers “ the masters of those vessels looked upon “ as passports, or, at least, as the means of “ insuring them from capture by English “ vessels of war. The King’s Order in “ Council of the 7th January, 1807, made “ all vessels liable to capture, coming out “ of any port situated, with regard to the “ enemy’s influence, as Trieste then was, “ and bound to another port under similar “ circumstances. The four vessels in question were stopped by Capt. Campbell, in “ sight of the port of Trieste; but, in consideration of their having sailed under “ faith of the English Consul’s papers, and “ of their not having attempted to escape “ from him; he directed them to return “ into the port; and wrote to the Consul, “ requesting him not to give any such papers in future, as it was only deceiving “ the masters of the vessels, and doing injury to them and the merchants. This “ communication to the Consul was made “ by letter, the bearer of which letter was “ Mr. Mant himself, who, as a further “ proof of Mr. Mant’s veracity, wrote a “ letter, now in Capt. Campbell’s possession, giving an account of his interview “ with the Consul upon the occasion. — “ Capt. Campbell has no doubt of his *strict* “ *right* to have considered the four vessels “ as lawful prize, under the Order in “ Council; but, under all the circumstances of the case, he also has no doubt, “ that a Judge of the Admiralty would “ have directed them to be restored. At “ any rate, they were *not made prize of*; “ they were *not given away*: there was no “ appearance of their having been given “ away; and of these facts Mr. Mant is as “ well acquainted as is Capt. Campbell “ himself. — Capt. Campbell is sorry to “ have taken up so much room with his “ statement; but, it appeared to him not “ too much to request after the large space “ which had been allowed to Mr. Mant, “ whom Capt. Campbell will now leave to “ the enjoyment of the society of that numerous and respectable circle of friends, “ who have given him full authority to “ publish, “ *that his veracity stands un-* “ *impeached.*”

THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON AND HIS ARMY.

—It is now to be hoped that those who so very lately believed in the total annihilation, the complete defeat of Bonaparte's army by Blucher, will, at least, acknowledge that they were somewhat mistaken; that, instead of the French Emperor having disgracefully fled, first to Paris, and afterwards to Normandy with only 15,000 troops, and without any chance of ever again recovering himself, he neither retreated from the scene of action, nor was worsted in the field of battle; but, on the contrary, kept possession of the ground, in spite of the superior army which was opposed to him, and was only induced to suspend his operations in the North, that he might drive back the Austrian army which had again advanced in the South. The reader will recollect, when the subject of Napoleon's military exploits was last under consideration, in the Register of the 19th, ult., at which period the people of England were rejoicing over his fall, and celebrating the event by discharges of cannon, that I did not hesitate in advancing an opinion directly opposed to that which was then almost universally received; that I frankly avowed my disbelief of the intelligence which had been promulgated; that I regarded the battle of the 9th, if any was fought on that day, as a mere partial affair; and concluded my observations with this remark, that whether "Blucher engaged the French on the 9th or not, I have no hesitation in saying, that the result of this battle, even admitting the loss to be as great as stated, will, in my opinion, have little or no effect on the grand scale of operations upon which Napoleon now appears to be acting."—The result, at least as far as things have yet gone, has shown that I was not altogether mistaken in my opinion. Dispatches having been received from Colonel Lowe, containing details of the affairs before Laon, to the 12th ult., it appears from these that, though there had been a good deal of hard fighting, during which, he says, the Allies were in part successful; yet that, at the close of the contest, Blucher remained on the heights of Laon, while the French army occupied the plains below, almost close to the walls of that place. "The fires of his bivouack (says Colonel Lowe) were apparent along a very extended line at the beginning of the night; but in the morning it was discovered he had *retired*."—Marshal Blucher addressed a proclamation to the French from Laon on the 13th, in which he said,

"Our armies are at present *more numerous and finer than ever*," and told them, "in order to judge of the events of the war, you have only to enquire of the inhabitants of Laon, concerning what happened on the 9th and 10th of this month, on which days the French army, *commanded by the Emperor Napoleon in person*, was *totally defeated* under the walls of that town: ask of them if they did not see the army fly before our victorious troops, if they have not seen the trophies of our victory, consisting of 50 pieces of cannon, of numerous caissons, and some thousand prisoners? And it was, besides, only a part of the army entrusted to my command which gained this *decisive victory*, while another part made themselves masters of St. Quentin, where they took 45 pieces of brass cannon, and while the grand army, after having on the 3d and 4th defeated near Troyes, the corps opposed to it, is advancing on the other side towards your capital."—Without stopping to enquire whether this proclamation is genuine or not, I shall subjoin the French official account of what happened on the 9th and 10th, which, perhaps, will enable us to form a more correct opinion on the subject:—"On the 9th, at day break (says the French bulletin), we reconnoitred the enemy, who had joined the Prussian corps. The position was such as to be deemed unattackable. We took a position. The Duke of Ragusa, who had slept on the 8th at Corbone, appeared at two in the afternoon at Veslud, overthrew the enemy's advanced guard, attacked the village of Althies, which was carried, and was *successful during the whole day*. At half-past six he took up a position. At seven the enemy made a dash of cavalry, one league in the rear, where the Duke of Reggio had a park of reserve. The Duke of Ragusa proceeded thither quickly, but the enemy had time to carry off 15 pieces of cannon. A great part of the personnel was saved. —On the same day General Charpentier, with his division of the young guard, carried the village of Clacy. On the next day the enemy attacked the village seven times, and were seven times *repulsed*. Gen. Charpentier lost 400 prisoners. The enemy left the avenues covered with his dead. The Emperor's head-quarters were on the 9th and 10th at Chavignon.—His Majesty, judging that it was impossible to attack the heights of Laon, fixed his head-quarters on the 11th at Soissons. The Duke of Ragusa occupied on the same day Bery au Bac."—I shall say nothing here of the

vast difference in the above two accounts as to the number of cannon lost by the French; nor shall I make any remarks upon the statement of Blucher, who asserts, that the French army was commanded by Bonaparte *in person*, though Napoleon expressly says, that his "head-quarters were on the 9th and 10th at Charignon." But if, as Marshal Blucher says, his army was *more numerous and finer than ever*, how came he to shut himself closely up in Laon, and to decline marching this fine and numerous army against the French, who were confessedly *inferior* in every respect? According to our accounts, Blucher's force amounted to 90,000 veteran troops, while the French had only 60,000 raw undisciplined conscripts. With such a superiority of force, one would have expected that the redoubted, the valiant, and the enterprising Blucher, would have carried every thing before him; would, in reality, have annihilated the unskilful, the cowardly Bonaparte, and made good his march to Paris. But no; instead of descending to the plain, and punishing the audacity of his insignificant rival, he considered it more advisable to remain snug within the walls of an impregnable fortress, and wisely preferred security and safety, in the protection afforded by the cannon which bristled on the ramparts with which he was surrounded, to vain-glory in the field of battle, of which he did not stand in need: instead of wielding the sword to destroy "the enemy of the human race," and restore enslaved Europe to its former happy condition; instead of wasting his time on the "vile caitiff," the "bastard Corsican," he manfully seized the pen, and sent forth an address to the people of France, to make it known, "that the towns and villages whose inhabitants shall dare to take up arms against our troops, or oppose our military operations, SHALL BE BURNT, *painful* as it will be to me, to be *compelled* in this manner to *punish the innocent with the guilty*." Humane and feeling old man! No one can doubt that a vengeance so exemplary, was *painful* to you: No one will suppose, that you could be driven to the dire necessity of thus outraging your tender feelings; of lacerating your kind and benevolent heart, but by circumstances which you could neither foresee nor controul your case is indeed a hard one; but there is one source remaining, to which you can still apply for consolation, and it is this,—that "the race is not always to the swift nor the battle to the strong." Though, from the most profound

reasons, you considered it the best policy not to risk a general engagement at Laon, the moment may again arrive when you shall have an opportunity of humbling your haughty opponent, as effectually as you humbled him at Leipsic.—But while the gallant Marshal was thus endeavouring to intimidate the people of France, Bonaparte was employed in following up his successes. Learning that a division of Blucher's army had surprised and taken possession of Rheims on the 12th, the French Emperor proceeded next day in person to that city, from which he drove the Prussians, who lost "22 pieces of cannon, 5,000 prisoners, and 100 artillery and baggage waggons." Meanwhile, the grand army, as it is called, under Schwartzberg, taking advantage of the absence of Bonaparte, made a movement, in advance, towards Provins and Nangis. Immediately on receiving intelligence of these operations, Napoleon set out for the South; passed the Aube and the Seine on the 19th; and reached Arcis-sur-Aube on the morning of the 20th, the Russians and Austrians flying in all directions on hearing of his approach. The head quarters of the Allied sovereigns, which were at Arcis-sur-Aube on the 16th, were transferred, in all haste to Troyes, and thence to Bar-sur-Aube, where by the last official accounts, they took up a position on the 18th. Thus we find that Napoleon has driven the Allied armies much farther from Paris than he had done at any period since he set out to command his army. Blucher was 80 miles north, and Schwartzberg was fully 120 miles south of the French capital. The *Courier*, with its usual confidence, tells us that "another blow has been dealt by the hand of the venerable and heroic Blucher, and it should seem as if it were ordained that the humbling of the *coarse* oppressor of Prussia, was especially reserved for that high spirit which could never brook that oppression, and which remained erect amidst the prostration of his country."—"This intelligence (continues the same writer) has been confirmed by accounts received by government." But if government had received accounts of this "other blow," is it to be believed that they would not have given them to the public in one form or another?—The fact is, this is the era of *hoaxing*, and those connected with the *Courier*, who perhaps know more of the late Exchange affair, than is generally believed, wished very probably to have another slice of the Omnium before it fell below their notice.

—This sort of Stock which was lately so high as $33\frac{1}{4}$ was on Wednesday down as low as 12 per cent. In the morning it had opened at 16; but its rapid decline having been perceived, an attempt was immediately made to counteract this.—A report was industriously circulated, that the Allies had defeated Bonaparte in a general engagement, and the *Courier* stopped the press at an early hour, to announce the intelligence in the following paragraph:—“*Courier Office, Two o’Clock.*—It is reported in the City, but we have not been able to trace upon what authority, that Blucher gained a great victory over Bonaparte, in which the latter lost 25,000 men, in killed, wounded, and prisoners.”—This new attempt to impose upon the credulity of the public, was, however, soon detected, and the Omnium market closed at a premium of $12\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. Considering that the head quarters of Bonaparte and of the Allies were little more than thirty-five miles from each other when the last accounts came away, it is very probable we may soon hear of some important results from that quarter, providing the Allies do not, as they have hitherto frequently done, decline the battle offered them by Napoleon, and seek for safety in a precipitate retreat. If a general engagement takes place, it is my opinion that it will have a very different termination from that reported by the *Courier*. But if there has been no battle, no general affair, it is difficult to say, according to the present mode of conducting the war, when it may be brought to a conclusion.

PEACE OR WAR?—The prospect of peace seems to become the more distant as the parties advance in the negotiation. I have uniformly stated, that this was not a matter which could be so soon or so easily settled as most people imagined. In the House of Commons, on Wednesday evening, the following conversation, as it appeared in the *Morning Chronicle* of Thursday, took place on this interesting subject:—“*Mr. Brand* rose for the purpose of putting two questions to the Right Honourable Gentleman (the Chancellor of the Exchequer), to answer which he hoped there would be no objection. First, whether Government had sent out, or was about to send out, a ship to convey the Duke of Berri to Bourdeaux?—and, Secondly, whether Negotiations were still carried on at Chatillon between the Ambassadors of the Allies and of the Emperor of France?

—*Mr. Vansittart* replied, that with regard to the second question, he should have thought that the Honourable Member would have been aware, that in the present situation of affairs it would not be fit to give any answer upon the subject. On the first inquiry we understood the Right Honourable Gentleman to put a negative; but the low tone of voice in which he spoke would not permit what he said to be distinctly heard in the gallery.”—The *Times* of the same day, reported the conversation as follows:—“*Mr. Brand* wished to ask the Right Honourable Gentleman opposite, if any negotiation were now carrying on with the ruler of France.—The Chancellor of the Exchequer (as far as we could collect) declined to answer the question, upon principles of public duty.”—It is clear, from both these statements, that the negotiations have not made that progress which the country were long ago led to expect, partly in consequence of the frequent prorogations of Parliament, and partly from the statements of the *Courier*, which has asserted, more than once, that the preliminaries were actually signed, and on their way to this country to be ratified. It is some time since it was known, that the conferences for an armistice had failed, in consequence of the terms proposed by the Allies having been considered by Bonaparte as unjust. “We were agreed (said the French Emperor) upon the points of occupation in the North and East, but the enemy wished not only to extend his line upon the Soane and the Rhone, but to inclose Savoy in it. We replied to this unjust pretension, by proposing to adopt the *status quo*, and to leave the Duke of Castiglione and Count Bubna to settle it upon the line of their advanced posts. This was rejected.” I have no doubt that the line of demarkation agreed upon in the North and East, was on the German side of the Rhine. But be this as it may, I cannot help thinking, that it was rather asking too much, for the Allies to demand, that their troops should be allowed to extend their line on the South; that they should be permitted to enter territories which they had not been able to overrun; and which, it is more than probable, if the war continues, that they never will. Nothing could be fairer, in my opinion, than to leave the generals opposed to each other in that quarter, to settle the boundary “upon the line of their advanced posts.” This was the proposal of Napoleon; but it was rejected, and with this rejection terminated all conferences for an armistice. The Gov-

rier has since published the following bulletin, respecting the negotiations for peace:

—"We understand the Preliminaries of Peace are in substance agreed upon. France is to be reduced to her ancient boundaries—those of 1789.—But the Allies insist upon certain fortresses in *Old France* being given up to them as securities till a definitive treaty of peace.—These are, Strasbourg, Metz, Valenciennes, Lisle, Bayonne, and Perpignan.—Upon the question of the surrender of these fortresses alone, if not entirely, we understand, the signature of Preliminaries stands over.—

It is said that Bonaparte is willing to surrender some of them; the Allies, of course, to retire to the frontiers of *Old France*."

—Now, upon this statement, I would remark, that if the Allies have really gone so far as to demand of Bonaparte the possession of any of the fortresses in *Old France*, as securities till a definitive treaty, it is impossible they can be sincere in their professions of peace; or that Napoleon will ever listen to their terms. If he held it to be an *unjust pretension* in the Allies to wish to extend their line upon the Soane and the Rhone, which may be considered mere frontier rivers, how much more unjust must he consider it in them to insist on the possession of several strong holds in the *very heart* of this kingdom?—The demand is, indeed, of so arrogant a nature, that one does not know whether to treat it with contempt or with ridicule. I cannot believe that the Allies, after the declaration which they published at Frankfort, in which they sanctioned the claims of France to a greater extent of territory than she enjoyed under her ancient kings, would, so soon after this, have presumed to demand the possession of any part of old France as the guarantee of a general peace. But though I do not subscribe to this absurdity, it appears to me that terms have been proposed to Napoleon which, if not departed from, will create a rupture in the negociation. How and where the proposal has originated, it is not for me to say; but when I consider the *high and hostile tone* which has been assumed of late in the proclamations of the Generals commanding the opposing armies, I have little doubt that it is only the sword which can put an end to the contest. Let those who think otherwise read the following extracts from a proclamation addressed to the French, by Prince Schwarzenburgh, on the 15th ult.:—"We will secure your happiness at the hazard of our own lives, and peace shall not be denied to you, although it may be de-

layed. That we may control it, reinforcements are arriving from all quarters. Thousands have flocked to my standard from Bohemia and Hungary, and others are hastening from Belgium and from Holland, from Prussia, and from every district of Germany. Entertain, then, no fears for the result; that is obvious and certain; and in the *painful interval* be assured that no means shall be neglected for your consolation, while you remain in a state in which you must necessarily be exposed to many of the miseries of war."—To this I shall only add the following extracts from a proclamation of the Duke of Dalmatia (Soult), which, though dated the 10th of March, may be read as an answer to the above; and then leave the reader to form his own opinion on the subject.—"Soldiers, you are called to *new combats*: there will be *no repose for us*, whether we be the assailants or the assailed, till this hostile army, formed of such extraordinary elements, shall be annihilated, or till it shall have evacuated the territory of the empire, whatever be its numerical superiority, and whatever progress it may make. It does not suspect the dangers which surround it, nor the perils which await it: but time will teach this army, as well as the General who commands it, that it is not with impunity that parts of our territory are invaded; that it is not with impunity that the French honour is insulted."—"As for us, our duty is marked out: *honour and fidelity!* that is our motto. To combat to the last the enemies of our august Emperor, and of our dear France; to respect persons and property: to pity the misfortunes of those who are for a moment subjected, and to hasten the instant of their deliverance; obedience and discipline, implacable hatred to traitors, and to the enemies of the French name, interminable war to those who should attempt to divide in order to destroy us, as well as to the wretches who would desert the Imperial eagles to range themselves under any other standard.—Let us have always in our minds fifteen ages of glory, and the innumerable triumphs which have rendered our country illustrious. Let us contemplate the prodigious efforts of our great Emperor, and his signal victories, which will eternize the French name; let us be worthy of him, and then we may bequeath to our posterity, without a stain, the inheritance which we have received from our fathers. Let us be Frenchmen, and let us die with arms in our hands rather than survive our dishonour."

OCCURRENCES OF THE WAR.—The great length to which the important case of Lord Cochrane and the Hon. Cochrane Johnstone extended in the last Number of the Register, having excluded the usual notices under this head, it becomes necessary that they should be here introduced. —Marquis Wellington, before effecting the passage of the Adour, attacked the French army under Marshal Soult near Orthes, and obtained over it a signal victory: the battle was fought on the 27th of February, and was contested for sometime with great obstinacy. “The enemy (says the official dispatch) retired at first in admirable order, taking every advantage of the numerous good positions which the country afforded. The losses, however, which they sustained in the continued attacks of our troops, and the danger with which they were threatened by Lieut.-Gen. Sir Rowland Hill’s movements, soon accelerated their movements, and the retreat at length became a flight, and their troops were in the utmost confusion.” —No account has been published of the extent of the enemy’s loss. Ours has been stated at 1,610 men killed and wounded, among which there were 14 officers killed and 104 wounded. The Portuguese lost 70 killed and 500 wounded. On the 1st of March, part of our troops passed the Adour, while Soult retired, first towards Agen, and then to Tarbis, leaving the road open to Bordeaux, which was afterwards occupied by a division of our army under Marshal Beresford. Lord Wellington, however, did not cross the Adour, but remained at Aire; and, from a dispatch of his Lordship’s, dated at that place on the 14th ult., it appears, that Soult had effected a junction with the army of Catalonia, commanded by Suchet, and was collecting “a considerable force in the neighbourhood of Couches,” a small town in the rear of Lord Wellington, and only a few miles from Aire. It is probable, therefore, that we may soon hear of another engagement having been fought in that direction.

Accounts from Spain mention, that a very general interest has been excited there

by the expectation of the immediate arrival of King Ferdinand, who, it is well known, was lately advised to return to his kingdom by Bonaparte. It is even said, that he reached Madrid on the 17th ult. Whatever may be the ulterior views of Napoleon in promoting this measure, it is certain that a strong persuasion exists, both in Spain and Portugal, that he calculates upon effecting our expulsion from these countries, by the restoration of the former dynasty. The following extract of a letter from Lisbon, dated the 26th February, to a gentleman in London, may give some idea of the feeling of the public mind upon this subject. I have seen the original, which never has been published:—“The news from Spain is bad to-day, as the nobles and clergy want to ratify Ferdinand’s treaty with Bonaparte, and the Cortes and people are against it. There will be some trouble in that country. The Portuguese here are very jealous of the English, in consequence of the loss of the Brazil trade, which the English have almost monopolized, and from *that trade* (the Brazilian) the Portuguese *principally* derived their revenues. Lisbon has dwindled away very much in a commercial view; the number of English merchants are *diminished one half*.” —To show that the writer of this letter cannot be charged with jacobinism, I have subjoined the following extract:—“As I shall deviate *one point* from the line of conduct I have chalked out, I can only do it for *your* advantage, being a *patriot*—that is, before you again *censure* what you consider a flaw in the British administration, just take a voyage, and see the *conduct* and *management* of other countries, and, take my word, you will consider it your *greatest pride* to call *yourself* an Englishman.”

NOTICE.

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